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ABSTRACT 
Dynamic reliability methods aim at complementing the capability of traditional static approaches (e.g., 
Event Trees (ETs) and Fault Trees (FTs)) by accounting for the system dynamic behavior and its interactions 
with the system state transition process. For this, the system dynamics is here described by a time-dependent 
model that includes the dependencies with the stochastic transition events. In this paper, we present a novel 
computational framework for dynamic reliability analysis whose objectives are i) accounting for discrete 
stochastic transition events and ii) identifying the prime implicants (PIs) of the dynamic system. The 
framework entails adopting a Multiple-Valued Logic (MVL) to consider stochastic transitions at discretized 
times. Then, PIs are originally identified by a Differential Evolution (DE) algorithm that looks for the 
optimal MVL solution of a covering problem formulated for MVL accident scenarios. For testing the 
feasibility of the framework, a dynamic non-coherent system composed by five components that can fail at 
discretized times has been analyzed, showing the applicability of the framework to practical cases.  
Keywords: Dynamic reliability, Prime Implicants, Multiple-Valued Logic, Differential Evolution. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) aims at capturing the scenarios of failure that can affect the 
system, and quantifying the likelihood of their occurrence and the consequences they may produce 
[Stuk, 1993]. The assessment is based on static system modeling tools, such as Fault Trees (FTs) 
and Event Trees (ETs), which allow describing the logic of system failure and accident evolution, 
and quantifying the related probabilities [Rosenberg, 1996; Zio, 2007]. However, FTs and ETs 
cannot adequately account for the impact of the dynamic interactions among continuous physical 
parameters of the process (temperature, pressure, speed, etc.), stochastic discrete failure events of 
the hardware and software components, and human operators actions dynamic systems 
[Marseguerra et al., 1996; Devooght, 1997; Pate´-Cornell, 2002; Li et al., 2005; Kirschenbaum  et 
al., 2009; Aldemir, 2013]. PRA of dynamic systems calls also accounting for sequence and timing 
of the events, because these influence the development of the accident scenario, and Minimal Cut 
Sets (MCS), i.e., the minimal combination of elementary events that make the whole system fail 
within a static reliability analysis [Quine, 1952], lose their meaning [Morreale, 1967]. In these 
cases, PIs have been introduced as an extension of MCSs to convey the information on the 
minimum combinations of failures (with a certain order and timing) that lead the system to failure 
and that cannot be covered by more general implicants [Garret et al., 1999]. Moreover, the logic 
behind these dynamic interactions can give rise to non-coherent structure functions, where both 
failed and working states of the same components can lead the system to failure. As an example of 
non-coherent system, suppose that a system is composed by the components J,K and L and that the 
combination of events , ,J K L  (components J and K failed and component L working) causes a 
catastrophic system failure, i.e., the system has a non-coherent structure function. PIs identification 
can help developing an effective maintenance schedule for non-coherent systems: if components J, 
K and L have failed, L should be the last component to be repaired in order to avoid system failure 
and additional counteracting measures could be taken to prevent system failure, for example by 
forcing failure of component L when component J and K have already failed [Sharvia et al., 2008]. 
Moreover, a realistic reliability analysis should consider failures that can occur at any continuous 
time, with any order and magnitude: when component failures occur at different times and/or with 
different magnitudes, the same combination of failed components does not lead unequivocally to 
one failure mode and the same scenario can result in different failure modes [Devooght, 1992]. 
Therefore, the so-called dynamic reliability methods have been developed aiming at explicitly 
modeling these interaction phenomena [Devooght, 1997]. Dynamic reliability methods can be 
categorized into continuous and discrete approaches [Aldemir, 2013]: the former entail, at each 
point of time, to model the stochastic variability of accident scenarios evolution, whereas the latter 
consider discrete times of failure events. 
Continuous Event Trees (CETs) [Devooght et al., 1992; Kopustinskas et al., 2005] provide a 
realistic framework for all possible failure events due to process/hardware/software/firmware/ 
human interactions into a single integrated model. However, the application of this and other 
continuous time techniques is limited by their computationally intensive nature and by the need of 
tailoring their algorithms to the system under consideration. 
The conceptually simpler discrete time approach by direct Monte Carlo Simulation (MC) 
[Marseguerra et al., 1996; Labeau, 2006] generates most probable time branchings for the ET to 
simulate a discrete set of accident scenarios. Dynamic Event Trees (DETs) [Hofer et al., 2004; 
Hakobyan et al., 2008] determine the system responses to different accident events timings and 
sequences by branching conditions selected by the analyst. The major challenge of DETs is the need 
of processing a massive amount of data for any single initiating event considered and, thus, it 
requires an efficient post-processing tool for treating the accumulated information [Di Maio et al., 
2011a]. Petri Nets allow dynamic reliability analysis by modeling the system in terms of 
information transmission between nodes of a graph structure [Petersen, 1981]: nodes represent a set 
of all possible system states, links are possible state transitions and an initial token placed into one 
of the nodes represents the initial system state condition at the initial time. Discrete state 
simulations are run moving tokens among places, recording system state changes and treating 
parameter evolution [Labeau et al., 2000]. Dynamic Flowgraph Methodology (DFM) provides a 
modeling and analysis environment in which the system variables are represented by a finite 
number of states and the system dynamics is expressed by a cause-and-effect relationship between 
these states [Aldemir, 2013]. DFM is based on parameter values discretization and can produce 
“timed FTs”, which are FTs in which timing relations are systematically taken into account [Garret 
et al., 1999]. The FTs can then be analyzed to determine how the system can reach a certain failure 
mode by backtracking faults by deductive/inductive analysis [Aldemir, 2013], yielding the Prime 
Implicants (PIs), i.e., the minimal sets of component failure events that are sufficient to cause a 
failure (top event) of a dynamic system and that cannot be covered by a more general implicant 
[Quine, 1952]. 
The objective of this work is to develop a discrete time framework for the dynamic reliability 
analysis of non-coherent systems, which i) discretizes continuous variables ii) accounts for 
stochastic discrete events iii) identifies the prime implicants (PIs) of a dynamic system, where the 
time of occurrence of each component failure is important for the determination of the system 
parameters evolution. We use Multiple-Valued Logic (MVL) theory for accurately modeling the 
behavior of the system, where timing and sequences of component failure events can be critical in 
determining the system failure mode. In fact, MVL theory increases the limited description 
capability of binary variables in real cases [Garibba et al., 1985], and components can thus be in 
different states of operation (for example, a valve that can be closed, partially closed or fully open, 
or can fail at different times). For ease of illustration of the continuous to discrete time 
representation proposed, we resort to a case study composed by five components that can fail at 
different discrete times with random magnitudes, where the time of occurrence of each component 
failure is important for the determination of the system parameters evolution and its failure mode. 
These simulated accident scenarios aim at reproducing real conditions that can be envisaged in real 
complex systems, as in the Residual Heat Removal system (RHRs) in the High Temperature-Pebble 
Modular Reactor (HTR-PM) [Zio et al., 2010; Di Maio et al., 2011b], where specific components 
failures influence the outlet water temperature. 
PIs identification is here tackled as an optimization problem, which is a Set Covering Problem 
(SCP) [Beasley et al., 1996] defined by the MVL accident scenarios, whose solution amounts to 
finding the minimum combination of implicants that can guarantee the best coverage of all the 
minterms that make the system fail. The difficulty in developing efficient methods for PIs 
identification lies in the fact that each subset of implicants has an associated cost proportional to its 
dimension and the objective of the problem is to choose the smallest group of subsets whose union 
contains the whole set with minimal cost (this will be explained in details in what follows).To 
overcome this hurdle, the optimization problem for PIs identification is here solved in an original 
way with a short computational time, by a Differential Evolution (DE)-based algorithm [Storn et al., 
1996] previously applied for the identification of MCSs [Di Maio et al., 2013]. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the case study used to generate the accident 
scenarios for the dynamic reliability analysis is presented, its non-coherence is shown and the 
limitation of a static reliability analysis is highlighted in that it may lead to a conservative PIs 
identification. In Section 3, MVL theory is introduced with reference to the case study considered. 
The DE-based approach is presented is Section 4 and, then, applied for PIs identification in the 
dynamic case study of Section 5. Conclusions and remarks are given in Section 5. 
 
2. CASE STUDY 
2.1  Static reliability analysis 
In order to show the way of general applicability of the proposed framework of PIs identification 
for dynamic and non-coherent systems, we consider a system composed by 5 components (A, B, C, 
D and E), that can fail at continuous random times with random magnitudes, giving rise to different 
scenarios, e.g., like those plotted in Fig. 1 with reference to a safety-relevant signal (continuous 
line) which needs to remain bounded within pre-defined thresholds for safety (dotted and dashed 
lines) [Baraldi et al., 2012]. The system life is set to T=7 [h]. If the safety-relevant signal exceeds 
the upper threshold value of 2.5, the system fails in the “High” failure mode; if it decreases below 
the lower threshold value of -1.5, the system failure mode is “Low”.  
 Fig 1. Evolution of the safety-relevant signal during simulated accident scenarios 
For example, the average temperature of the diathermic oil of the secondary loop of a Lead Bismuth 
Eutectic eXperimental Accelerator Driven System (LBE-XADS) can be considered as safety-
relevant signal: if it goes beyond the upper threshold of 340 °C, oil physical and chemical properties 
could be degraded, whereas if it goes below the lower threshold of 280 °C the structural 
components of the reactor could suffer of thermal shock [Zio et al., 2012]. Other examples of 
physical thresholds are: the upper limit of 1600 °C for the fuel cladding temperature of the High 
Temperature-Pebble Modular Reactor (HTR-PM), that allows the safety function of fission products 
retain [Di Maio et al., 2011b] or the lower limit of the water level of a pressurizer in Pressurized 
Water Reactor (PWR), that avoids the undesirable state of uncovered electric heaters [Baraldi et al., 
2013]. 
A real system which has a strong similarity with the proposed case is the Residual Heat Removal 
system (RHRs) of the HTR-PM whose function is removing the residual heat from the core after a 
reactor shut-down [Di Maio et al., 2011b]. This safety system is composed of two circuits (trains) 
dedicated to heat removal, each one being connected to a loop of the primary circuit. The function 
of the RHRs trains is to transfer heat by natural convection from the reactor vessel through the 
water cooling wall and pipes to the air-cooling heat exchanger located in the air-cooling tower. The 
outlet temperature in each one of the two trains represents the equivalent of our safety-relevant 
signal. In fact, the outlet temperature cannot exceed 126 °C (upper threshold) because otherwise its 
thermal transmission properties would deteriorate and drive the system into the “High” failure 
mode. On the other hand, a temperature value equal to that of the cold sink of the air-water 
exchanger in the air cooling tower (lower threshold) would put the train out of service into the 
“Low” failure mode, and, therefore, cause a sharp increase in the outlet temperature of the other 
train [Di Maio et al., 2011b]. 
The basic failure events which can produce an increase of the outlet temperature can be: the 
reduction of the number of air cooling pipes in the two air-water heat exchangers (e.g. failure of 
components A and B), the reduction of the number of water cooling wall pipes connecting the two 
RHRs trains with the primary circuit (e.g., failure of component E), whereas the temperature 
decrease can be caused by the blockage of the inlet shutters of the air cooling tower (e.g. failure of 
components C and D) [Di Maio et al., 2011b]. 
In our case study, a Monte Carlo sampling procedure injects faults of random magnitudes at t=0 for 
all possible combinations of components failures (Tab. 1). The number of components that fail in an 
accident scenario is sampled from a binomial distribution with parameters n=5 (the number of 
components) and p=0.8 (so that even rare multiple fault events are included in the set of accident 
scenarios simulated [Zio et al., 2009]). 
The equations used to simulate the safety-relevant signal evolution y(t) during each of the system 
configurations of Tab. 1 are shown in Tab. 2. Parameters a, b, c, d, ω, α1, α2 and α3 are randomly 
sampled from the distributions listed in Tab. 3 and can be interpreted as determining the magnitude 
of the failure events of the components A, B, C, D and E. They are obtained by stratified sampling 
[Di Maio et al., 2011a].  
 
System 
configuration 
Components that do not fail Components that fail 
1 A, B, C, D and E - 
2 B, C, D and E A 
3 A, C, D and E B 
4 A, B, D and E C 
5 A, B, C and E D 
6 A, B, C and D E 
7 C, D and E A and B 
8 B, D and E A and C 
9 B, C and E A and D 
10 B, C and D A and E 
11 A, D and E B and C 
12 A, C and E B and D 
13 A, C and D B and E 
14 A, B and E C and D 
15 A, B and D C and E 
16 A, B and C D and E 
17 D and E A, B and C 
18 C and E A, B and D 
19 C and D A, B and E 
20 B and E A, C and D 
21 B and D A, C and E 
22 B and C A, D and E 
23 A and E B, C and D 
24 A and D B, C and E 
25 A and C B, D and E 
26 A and B C, D and E 
27 E A, B, C and D 
28 D A, B, C and E 
29 C A,B, D and E 
30 B A, C, D and E 
31 A B, C, D and E 
32 - A, B, C, D and E 
Tab. 1. Possible system configurations for the case study 
Failed Component Safety-relevant signal 
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Tab. 2. Equations used to simulate the safety-relevant signal evolution for each failed component  
Parameter Distribution Mean value Standard deviation 
a Gaussian 0.4 0.017 
b Gaussian 0.4 0.017 
c Gaussian 1.3 0.033 
d Gaussian 1.3 0.017 
1  Gaussian 1 0.083 
2  Gaussian 1.05 0.033 
3  Gaussian 1 0.033 
ω Gaussian 0 1 
 
Tab. 3. Distribution of the parameters of the Equations of Tab. 2  
Without loss of generality, among the system configurations of Tab. 1 (also referred to as 
minterms), we search for those leading to the failure mode “Low”. PIs are those minterms whose set 
of variables (that in this case are Boolean and indicate if at t=0 components A, B, C, D or E are 
failed ( )X  or not ( )),X  represent minimal accident component failures necessary for the failure 
mode occurrence and cannot be covered by a more reduced implicant [Quine, 1952]. The PIs 
identification is performed in an original way with a DE-based algorithm (see Section 4), which has 
been proven to provide a faster search than Quine-McCluskey algorithm [Di Maio et al., 2013]. As 
we shall see, DE is fed with a set of NP chromosomes 
1 2
( , ,..., )
R
x x x x , each one representing a 
possible solution made of R Boolean implicant values xi, equal to 1 if the i-th Boolean implicant is 
considered in the solution, otherwise 0.  
The 7 PIs, all of third-order (i.e., three components are listed for each implicant) are listed in Tab. 4. 
Notice the non-coherence of the system, as both failed and safe components contribute to the 
system failure mode.  
Prime Implicants (static reliability analysis) 
|   |   |   |A C E  
|   |   |   |B C E  
|   |  |   |A D E  
|   |  |   |B D E  
|   |  |   |C D E  
|   |   |   |B C D  
|   |   |   |A C D  
Tab. 4. PIs of the “Low” failure mode in the static reliability analysis 
 
2.2  Dynamic reliability analysis 
 
The assumption that all components that fail in a scenario do so all at the same time t=0 is 
unrealistically conservative. In a realistic (but computationally intractable) analysis one should 
consider failures that can occur at any continuous time, with any order and magnitude [Devooght, 
1992]. As a tractable approximation, we propose a computational framework that assumes that the 
components can fail at discrete times, e.g. values: t=0 [h], t=2 [h] and t=5 [h] for our case study, 
representative of “early”, “intermediate” and “late” failures, respectively, rather than only at t=0 as 
in the previous analysis of Section 2.1.  
With these settings, it can be concluded that the same combination of failed components does not 
lead unequivocally to one failure mode: when component failures occur at different times and/or 
with different magnitudes, the resulting failure mode can be different. For example, if a failure 
occurs “late” in the mission time (as opposed to an “early” failure event), it may not lead to system 
failure or viceversa (if the system is non-coherent) [Di Maio et al., 2011a]. This is shown in Fig. 2 
where the frequencies of the three system failure modes (“High”, “Safe” and “Low”) are plotted for 
the 32 system configurations of Tab. 1, when times of failures are sampled from discrete 
distributions and failure magnitudes from continuous distributions. 
In Fig. 3 the same plot for the frequencies of system failure modes are reported for system 
configurations generated with continuous random times and magnitudes. It can be seen from the 
similarity of the histograms of Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 that the hypothesis of discrete (early, intermediate 
and late) failure times is a good approximation. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Histograms of the frequency of the failure modes for each of the 32 system configurations of 
Tab. 1, simulated with discrete failure times 
 
 Fig. 3. Histograms of the frequency of the failure modes for each of the 32 system configurations of 
Tab. 1, simulated with random failure times and magnitudes 
 
 
Note that non-coherence of the system is maintained: some of the 32 system configurations do not 
end in the same failure mode all the time. In fact, as shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, both failed and 
working states of a set of components can contribute to the failure of the system. In Fig. 4 (left) the 
safety-relevant signal evolution is shown when components B and D continue working for the 
whole mission time, whereas component A fails at t=0, C at t=2 and E at t=2: this combination of 
failures allows the system to work in “Safe” conditions. On the other hand, in Fig. 4 (upper right) 
the same signal is plotted when components B, D and E (recovered) continue working for all the 
mission time, component A fails at t=0 and C at t=2, leading the system to “Low” failure mode; 
when components B, C and D (recovered) continue working for all the mission time, component A 
fails at t=0 and E at t=2 as in Fig. 4 (lower right), the system failure mode is “High”. 
Another example of non-coherence is shown in Fig. 5. A combination of three failures allows the 
system working in “Safe” conditions (left), whereas the recovery of component C leads the system 
into “High” failure mode (upper right) and the recovery of component B into “Low” (lower right). 
 
 
 Fig 4. Example of non-coherence 
 
Fig. 5. Example of non-coherence
 
 
 
3. MULTIPLE-VALUED LOGIC FOR PIs IDENTIFICATION 
In a dynamic and non-coherent system as the one described in Section 2.2, the PIs identification is 
challenged by the need of representing the components that fail at discrete times (“early”, 
“intermediate” and “late”). For this, we originally adopt a MVL rather than the Boolean logic. In 
our case, the different value levels of the multistate variables indicate the different time instants at 
which the components fail.  In particular, with respect to component X, the multistate variable can 
assume four different values: 
- @ 0X t  , if X fails at t=0 (“early failure”)  
- @ 2X t  , if X fails at t=2 (“intermediate failure”)  
- @ 5X t  , if X fails at t=5 (“late failure”) 
- X , if X does not fail 
The concepts of minterm and PI can be applied to multistate components as well, provided that the 
variables that represent the components states are MVL rather than Boolean.  
As an example, the minterm | @ 2| | @ 5|   | @ 0|A t B C t E t     stands for an accident scenario 
where component B continues working, the state of component D is negligible for the determination 
of the system failure mode (“don’t care” value, |   | ), component A fails at t=2, C at t=5 and E at 
t=0. Similarly, we can extend the definition of MVL to implicants and PIs. 
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Traditionally, within the MVL framework, implicants can be reduced analytically by consensus 
operation yielding PIs [Ogunbiyi et al., 1981]: reduced implicants are created starting from the 
whole list of those leading the system to the failure mode of interest. The basic simplifying 
operation, called merging rule, is easy to apply: if s implicants are the same except for exactly one 
s-th event entry (where s is the number of states that the variables that represent each component 
can assume, equal to 4 in this case), and all the s possible states of the input variables exist in these 
implicants, then the s implicants can be merged and form a more reduced implicant [Ogunbiyi et al., 
1981]. In Tab. 5, an example of the merging rule is shown: 4 implicants are listed where 
components  B, C,  D and E appear in the same state (B failed at t=5, C failed at t=0, D failed at t=0 
and E working), while component A appears with a different state in each implicant. Therefore, we 
can apply the merging rule and obtain the reduced implicant shown on the last row of Tab. 5.  
 
A  @ 5B t   @ 0C t   @ 0D t   E  
@ 0A t   @ 5B t   @ 0C t   @ 0D t   E  
@ 2A t   @ 5B t   @ 0C t   @ 0D t   E  
@ 5A t   @ 5B t   @ 0C t   @ 0D t   E  
- @ 5B t   @ 0C t   @ 0D t   E  
 
Tab. 5. Example of an application of the merging rule 
The PIs identification method by consensus operation [Ogunbiyi et al., 1981] proceeds iteratively to 
the reduction of the list of implicants until the whole list of PIs are found. In the case of the system 
of Section 2.2 with respect to the “Low” failure mode, the consensus method finds the PIs listed in 
Appendix A. This method is simple to be implemented although it proves to be burdensome when 
applied to a complex dynamic system. For this reason, we resort to the powerful DE algorithm, 
whose basic concepts are quickly recalled in the next Section. 
 
4. DIFFERENTIAL EVOLUTION ALGORITHM 
DE belongs to the class of Evolutionary Algorithms (EAs) [Holland, 1975], which have proven 
effective in tackling optimization problems with high complexity, number of variables and 
dimensionality [Storn et al., 1996]. DE search for the optimum entails three phases, called mutation, 
crossover and selection [Wang et al., 2010]. In the mutation phase, a probability estimation vector 
       1 2, , , RP x P x P x P x     is created for each chromosome 1 2( , ,..., )Rx x x x  present in the 
population at the g-th generation, g=1, 2,..., G: 
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where [6,9]b  is a positive real constant, the weighting factor [0,2]F  is a user-defined parameter, 
kept constant during the optimization and ,  and l k m
r r r
x x x  are the r-th bits of three randomly chosen 
individuals, with indexes  , , 1,2,...,l k m NP . From ( ),rP x  the corresponding bit of the noisy vector 
v  of the current chromosome x  are generated by sampling: 
1          if ( )
0          otherwise
r
r
rand P x
v

 
  
where rand is a uniform random number in [0,1). 
The trial chromosome u
 
can be obtained by the crossover operator through Eq. (3): 
      if  or ( )
      otherwise
r
r
r
v rand CR r irand R
u
x
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 
  
where [0,1]CR  is a control parameter which influences the probability for v
 
to be selected for the 
mutation process,  irand(R) is a uniform discrete random number from the set  1,2,..., R , where R is 
the length of the chromosome. Therefore, at least one bit of the trial individual is inherited from the 
mutant individual so that DE is able to avoid duplication individuals and effectively search within 
the neighborhood. 
During the selection process, the population is modified by substitution. Referring to a 
minimization search, if the fitness of the trial chromosome u , i.e., the total cost of all the Π 
belonging to u , is less than the fitness of the optimal chromosome x , the former will be a member 
of the next generation g+1, replacing the target individual, and the trial vector is discarded 
        ( ) ( )
       
u if fitness u fitness x
x
x otherwise

 
  
It can be understood, then, that the selection criterion of DE is greedy, which guarantees that the 
following generation is better than or at least equal to the previous generation. 
 
5. RESULTS 
The results are illustrated for the “Low” failure mode as presented in Section 2.2. The optimization 
task regards the identification of all minterms (635) and implicants (1166) that lead the system to a 
“Low” failure mode, coherently with the NP-complete problem of covering a set (the minterms) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
with elements from a given subset (the implicants) [Sen, 1993]: a literal cost is associated to each 
implicant [Di Maio et al., 2014], equal to the number of components whose MVL state is specified 
in the implicant, and the PIs are chosen as the implicants subset which cover all the 635 minterms at 
a minimal literal cost.  
The DE algorithm manipulates R-dimensional chromosomes 
1 2
( , ,..., ),
R
x x x x  where R is equal to 
the number of implicants (equal to 1166 in our case) and a 1 is allocated in the i-th position if the i-
th implicant is chosen to be in the trial solution represented by the chromosome, otherwise a 0. We 
apply the DE algorithm with a “One complement” fitness function [Shackleford et al., 2001]: the 
cost of the solution (chromosome) is mapped into a binary function made up by two parts, where 
the most important digits are determined as the complement to one of the number of uncovered 
minterms, whereas the least important digits are determined as the complement to one of the literal 
cost of the implicants included in the solution. Therefore, we are looking for the solution with the 
highest fitness value. For the ease of clarity, since we have 635 minterms, 10 bits code the 
maximum number of uncovered minterms whereas the sum of the cost of all the 1166 implicants is 
equal to 5320 so that 13 bits code the cost part of the solution. In Fig. 6 the calculation procedure is 
shown for the solution with the highest fitness value (which corresponds to PIs): the uncovered 
minterms are equal to zero, while the total cost of the 180 PIs is equal to 661. The complement to 
one of 0 on 10 bits is equal to 1023, and the complement to one of 661 on 13 bits is equal to 7350: 
joining together the two parts of the fitness function gives a fitness value of 8387946. 
 
 
Fig.6. Procedure for the calculation of the ”One complement”  fitness function 
 
The number of chromosomes, NP, is set equal to 5000 and the maximum generation number, 
MAXGEN, is set equal to 2000. In Fig. 7, Fig. 8, Fig. 9, Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, the fitness values of the 
population in the DE search is plotted at the generation G=1, G=500, G=1000, G=1500 and 
G=2000, respectively. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Fitness values of the population at 
generation G=1 
 
 
Fig. 8. Fitness values of the population at 
generation G=500 
 
Fig. 9. Fitness values of the population at 
generation G=1000 
 
Fig. 10. Fitness values of the population at 
generation G=1500 
 
 
Fig. 11. Fitness values of the best solution 
obtained by the DE search at generation 
G=2000
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 The population at the first generation (Fig. 8) is randomly distributed in the search space; then, as 
generations evolve it tends to move toward the optimal solution with largest fitness value (Fig. 11). 
At the beginning, the population tends to cover all the minterms, even if the solutions have high 
literal costs (Figs. 9 and 10); then, when all minterms are covered, the DE algorithm moves toward 
the minimal literal costs (Figs. 10 and 11).   
The optimal solution is composed by 180 PIs, which cover all the 635 minterms with literal cost 
equal to 661. These results are the same as those obtained by the consensus method (Appendix A). 
A comparison with the PIs listed in Tab. 4 for the static reliability analysis (Section 2.1) highlights 
that the inclusion of the time of component failures in the definition of PIs leads to a significant 
increase of the PIs (from 7 to 180). For example, if we look for the subset of the PIs where 
components A and E do not fail, we find that in the static analysis there are two PIs (rows 1 and 3 of 
Table 4, respectively):  
- | | | |A C E   
- | | | |A D E   
whereas among the dynamic PIs we find: 
- | | @ 0 | |A C t E   
- | | @ 0| |A D t E  
- | | @ 2| |A C t E   
- | | @ 2| |A D t E   
- | | @ 5| @ 5| |A C t D t E    
- | | | @ 5| |A B C t E   
- | | | @ 5| |A B D t E   
- | | @ 2| @ 5| |A B t C t E    
- | | @ 2| @ 5| |A B t D t E    
- | | @ 5| @ 5| |A B t C t E    
- | | @ 5| @ 5| |A B t D t E    
This shows that a number of implicants (listed below) cannot be considered PIs because in the 
dynamic analysis these accident scenarios do not lead the system to the “Low” failure mode, 
although they are included in the set of those covered by rows 1 and 3 of Table 4, herein: 
- | | @ 5 | |A C t E   
- | | @ 5 | |A D t E   
- | | @ 5 | | |A C t D E   
- | | | @ 5 | |A C D t E   
- | | @ 0 | @ 5| |A B t C t E    
- | | @ 0 | @ 5| |A B t D t E    
- | | @ 0 | @ 5| | |A B t C t D E   
- | | @ 0 | | @ 5| |A B t C D t E   
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In the risk analysis of dynamic systems, timing of the events influences the development of the 
accident scenario, and, in case of non-coherent systems both failed and working states of the same 
components can lead to system failure. Traditional MCSs lose their meaning in these cases, and for 
this reason, PIs have been introduced as an extension of MCSs to convey the information on the 
minimum combinations of failures (with a certain order and timing) that lead the system to failure. 
In this paper, we have presented an innovative framework for PIs identification in dynamic non-
coherent systems. The proposed framework relies on MVL theory to account for the timing of the 
component failures in the definition of the accident scenarios and on a DE-based optimization 
algorithm for efficiently identifying the PIs. A case study has been solved by the proposed 
framework and the results have been compared to those obtained by a Quine-McCluskey algorithm 
and consensus operation method. The proposed framework has been shown faster than Quine-
McCluskey and consensus operation method, and also the results have confirmed the importance of 
including the dynamic aspects in the reliability analysis of systems for which the timing of events is 
relevant for the accident scenario evolution: indeed, in the example shown, some of the MCSs 
identified cannot be considered mimum combinations of failures leading to system failure, whereas 
PIs are capable of properly capturing the mimimum failure conditions. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
List of PIs for the system with discrete times of failure events (“early”, “intermediate”  and “late”, 
t=0,2,5, respectively) 
 
Prime Implicants (Dynamic Reliability Analysis) 
1. | @ 0| @ 0| |C t D t E   91. | | @ 5| @ 2| @ 2|A B t D t E t    
2. | @ 0| @ 0| @ 5|C t D t E t    92. | | @ 5| @ 2| @ 5|A B t D t E t    
3. | @ 0| @ 0| @ 2C t D t E t    93. | | @ 5| @ 5| |A B t D t E   
4. | @ 0| @ 2| |C t D t E   94. | | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5|A B t D t E t    
5. | @ 0| @ 2| @ 5|C t D t E t    95. | | @ 5| @ 0| @ 2|A B t C t E t    
6. | @ 0| @ 2| @ 2C t D t E t    96. | | @ 5| @ 2| @ 2|A B t C t E t    
7. | @ 0| @ 5| |C t D t E   97. | | @ 5| @ 0| @ 5|A B t C t E t    
8. | @ 0| @ 5| @ 5|C t D t E t    98. | | @ 5| @ 2| @ 5|A B t C t D t    
9. | @ 2| @ 0| |C t D t E   99. | | @ 5| @ 5| |A B t C t E   
10. | @ 2| @ 0| @ 5|C t D t E t    100. | | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5|A B t C t E t    
11. | @ 2| @ 0| @ 2C t D t E t    101. | | @ 5| @ 5| @ 2|A B t C t D t    
12. | @ 2| @ 2| |C t D t E   102. | | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5|A B t C t D t    
13. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 5|C t D t E t    103. | @ 2| @ 0| @ 0|A t C t D t    
14. | @ 2| @ 5| |C t D t E   104. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 2| @ 2|A t C t D t E t     
15. | @ 2| @ 5| @ 5|C t D t E t    105. | @ 2| | @ 2| @ 5|A t B D t E t    
16. | @ 5| @ 0| |C t D t E   106. | @ 2| | @ 5| |A t B D t E   
17. | @ 5| @ 0| @ 5|C t D t E t    107. | @ 2| | @ 2| @ 5|A t B C t E t    
18. | @ 5| @ 2| |C t D t E   108. | @ 2| | @ 2| @ 5|A t B C t D t    
19. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 5|C t D t E t    109. | @ 2| | @ 5| |A t B C t E   
20. | | @ 0| |B D t E  110. | @ 2| | @ 5| @ 2|A t B C t D t    
21. | | @ 0| @ 5|B D t E t   111. | @ 2| | @ 5| @ 5| @ 2|A t B C t D t E t     
22. | | @ 2| |B D t E  112. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 0| |A t B t D t E    
23. | | @ 0| |B C t E  113. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 2| |A t B t D t E    
24. | | @ 0| @ 5|B C t E t   114. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 0| |A t B t C t E    
25. | | @ 0| @ 0|B C t D t   115. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 0| @ 2|A t B t C t D t     
26. | | @ 0| @ 2|B C t D t   116. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 0| @ 5| @ 2|A t B t C t D t E t      
27. | | @ 0| @ 5|B C t D t   117. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 2| |A t B t C t E    
28. | | @ 2| |B C t E  118. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 2| @ 0|A t B t C t D t     
29. | | @ 2| @ 0|B C t D t   119. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 2| @ 2|A t B t C t D t     
30. | | @ 2| @ 2|B C t D t   120. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 2| @ 5| @ 2|A t B t C t D t E t    
 31. | | @ 2| @ 5| @ 2|B C t D t E t  
 
121. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 5| @ 0| @ 2|A t B t C t D t E t      
32. | | @ 5| @ 0|B C t D t   122. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 5| @ 2| @ 2|A t B t C t D t E t    
 33. | | @ 5| @ 2| @ 2|B C t D t E t  
 
123. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 5| @ 5| |A t B t C t D t E     
34. | | @ 5| @ 5| |B C t D t E   124. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 5| @ 5| @ 5|A t B t C t D t E t      
35. | | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5|B C t D t E t    125. | @ 2| @ 5| @ 2| @ 5|A t B t D t E t     
36. | @ 2| @ 0| @ 0|B t C t D t    126. | @ 2| @ 5| @ 2| @ 5|A t B t C t E t     
37. | @ 2| @ 5| @ 5| |A t B t D t E    127. | @ 2| @ 2| @ 2| @ 2|B t C t D t E t     
38. | @ 5| @ 0| |B t D t E   128. | @ 2| @ 5| @ 2| @ 5|A t B t C t D t     
39. | @ 5| @ 0| @ 5|B t D t E t    129. | @ 2| @ 5| @ 5| |A t B t C t E    
40. | @ 5| @ 2| |B t D t E   130. | @ 2| @ 5| @ 5| @ 2|A t B t C t D t     
41. | @ 5| @ 0| |B t C t E   131. | @ 2| @ 5| @ 5| @ 5| @ 2|A t B t C t D t E t      
42. | @ 5| @ 0| @ 5|B t C t E t    132. | @ 5| @ 0| |A t D t E   
43. | @ 5| @ 0| @ 0|B t C t D t    133. | @ 5| @ 0| @ 5|A t D t E t    
44. | @ 5| @ 0| @ 2|B t C t D t    134. | @ 5| @ 2| |A t D t E   
45. | @ 5| @ 0| @ 5|B t C t D t    135. | @ 5| @ 0| |A t C t E   
46. | @ 5| @ 2| |B t C t E   136. | @ 5| @ 0| @ 5|A t C t E t    
47. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 0|B t C t D t    137. | @ 5| @ 0| @ 0|A t C t D t    
48. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 2|B t C t D t    138. | @ 5| @ 0| @ 2|A t C t D t    
49. | @ 5| @ 0| @ 5|A t C t D t    139. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 5| @ 2|B t C t D t E t     
50. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 0|B t C t D t    140. | @ 5| @ 2| |A t C t E   
51. 
 
| @ 5| @ 2| @ 0|A t C t D t    141. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 2| @ 2|B t C t D t E t     
52. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5| |B t C t D t E    142. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 5| @ 2|A t C t D t E t     
53. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 2|A t C t D t    143. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5| @ 5|B t C t D t E t     
54. | | @ 0| |A D t E  144. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 0|A t C t D t    
55. | | @ 0| @ 5|A D t E t   145. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 2| @ 2|A t C t D t E t     
56. | | @ 2| |A D t E  146. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5| |A t C t D t E    
57. | | @ 0| |A C t E  147. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5| @ 5|A t C t D t E t     
58. | | @ 0| @ 5|A C t E t   148. | @ 5| | @ 0| @ 2|A t B D t E t    
59. | | @ 0| @ 0|A C t D t   149. | @ 5| | @ 2| @ 2|A t B D t E t    
60. | | @ 0| @ 2|A C t D t   150. | @ 5| | @ 2| @ 5|A t B D t E t    
61. | | @ 0| @ 5|A C t D t   151. | @ 5| | @ 5| |A t B D t E   
62. | | @ 2| |A C t E  152. | @ 5| | @ 5| @ 5|A t B D t E t    
63. | | @ 2| @ 0|A C t D t   153. | @ 5| | @ 0| @ 2|A t B C t E t    
64. | | @ 2| @ 2|A C t D t   154. | @ 5| | @ 2| @ 2|A t B C t E t    
65. | | @ 2| @ 5| @ 2|A C t D t E t  
 
155. | @ 5| | @ 2| @ 5|A t B C t E t    
66. | | @ 5| @ 0|A C t D t   156. | @ 5| | @ 2| @ 5|A t B C t D t    
67. | | @ 5| @ 2| @ 2|A C t D t E t  
 
157. | @ 5| | @ 5| |A t B C t E   
68. | | @ 5| @ 5| |A C t D t E   158. | @ 5| | @ 5| @ 5|A t B C t E t    
69. | | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5|A C t D t E t    159. | @ 5| | @ 5| @ 2|A t B C t D t    
70. | | | @ 0| @ 2|A B D t E t   160. | @ 5| | @ 5| @ 5|A t B C t D t    
71. | | | @ 2| @ 2|A B D t E t   161. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 2| @ 5|A t B t D t E t     
72. | | | @ 2| @ 5|A B D t E t   162. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 5| |A t B t D t E    
73. | | | @ 5| |A B D t E  163. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 2| @ 5|A t B t C t E t     
74. | | | @ 5| @ 5|A B D t E t   164. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 2| @ 5|A t B t C t D t     
75. | | | @ 0| @ 2|A B C t E t   165. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 5| |A t B t C t E    
76. | | | @ 2| @ 2|A B C t E t   166. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 5| @ 2|A t B t C t D t     
77. | | | @ 2| @ 5|A B C t E t   167. | @ 5| @ 2| @ 5| @ 5| @ 2|A t B t C t D t E t      
78. | | | @ 2| @ 5|A B C t D t   168. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 0| @ 2|A t B t D t E t     
79. | | | @ 5| |A B C t E  169. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 2| @ 2|A t B t D t E t     
80. | | | @ 5| @ 5|A B C t E t   170. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 2| @ 5|A t B t D t E t     
81. | | | @ 5| @ 2|A B C t D t   171. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5| |A t B t D t E    
82. | | | @ 5| @ 5|A B C t D t   172. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5| @ 5|A t B t D t E t     
83. | | @ 2| @ 2| @ 5|A B t D t E t    173. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 0| @ 2|A t B t C t E t     
84. | | @ 2| @ 5| |A B t D t E   174. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 2| @ 2|A t B t C t E t     
85. | | @ 2| @ 2| @ 5|A B t C t E t    175. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 2| @ 5|A t B t C t E t     
86. | | @ 2| @ 2| @ 5|A B t C t D t    176. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 2| @ 5|A t B t C t D t     
87. | | @ 2| @ 5| |A B t C t E   177. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5| @ 5|A t B t C t D t     
88. | | @ 2| @ 5| @ 2|A B t C t D t    178. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 2| @ 5|A t B t C t E t     
89. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5| |A t B t C t E    179. | | @ 2| @ 5| @ 5| @ 2|A B t C t D t E t     
90. | | @ 5| @ 0| @ 2|A B t D t E t    180. | @ 5| @ 5| @ 5| @ 2|A t B t C t D t     
 
